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Prices in the Asian residential property markets have skyrocketed over the 
past decade.  A high rate of economic growth is one of the major reasons 
for the price spiral.  Most Asian residential property markets are, however, 
concentrated and national in nature.  Maintaining an artificially high price 
level through coordination amongst producers is not impossible and would 
be the natural choice of oligopolistic behavior (Scherer and Ross, 1990).  
This study examines price responses to changes in economic 
determinants in Singapore.  The focus is on supply.  Cointegration and 
error-correction techniques are employed to test if upward and downward 
adjustment speeds are similar.  The results verify the impact of GDP 
growth, but also show that price response to the supply of housing units is 
significantly downward rigid.  This is not inconsistent with the hypothesis of 




Property price rigidity, Singapore, Oligopoly. 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Prices of Asian residential properties have skyrocketed over the last decade.  
Dynamic economic growth is one of the major reasons for this development.  
The bursting of the property price bubble in Japan, however, suggests that 
other factors may have contributed to high price levels. 
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As with all assets, the price of residential properties may not always be at 
equilibrium.  Market frictions could cause delays in price adjustments.  This is 
usually not a cause for concern.  On the other hand, the price level may be a 
result of oligopolistic behavior.  Industrial Organization literature has devoted 
copy to the issue of how the market structure can induce tacit arrangements 
amongst firms to maximize profits. 
 
In the classic  Industrial Market Structure and E conomic Performance, 
Scherer and Ross (1990) describe the conditions that facilitate oligopolistic 
behavior.  One such condition is when supply adjusts to demand with a time 
lag because of the need for setup, hiring, production and rate alterations etc. 
(John A. Carlson, 1973).  The property market is clearly marked by a 
significant delay in supply meeting demand.  While the lag in an average 
production process may take five months (Metzler, 1947) or less with 
computerization, the construction industry easily takes years to deliver its 
output. 
 
Scherer and Ross (1990) discuss five approaches to oligopolistic 
coordination.  In a market where supply lags behind demand, the natural 
alternative is through management of inventory to control prices.  This form 
of coordination is easier in a concentrated than an atomistic market.  As the 
authors put it “… motives for avoiding price adjustments are absent in 
atomistically structured and (rare) monopolistic markets.  Therefore, we 
should expect oligopolistic industries to rely more heavily than atomistic 
industries upon inventory and order backlog variations in adjusting to 
demand fluctuations, ceteris paribus, and less heavily upon price variations.  
Concretely, prices should be less variable … in oligopolistic than in atomistic 
industries”.  This description is almost tailor-made for the residential property 
industry. 
 
The “less variable pricing” described by the authors is not likely to be neutral 
in nature.  It can be expected to be asymmetric for “… if the oligopoly has 
been successful in elevating prices above the competitive level, its members 
cannot be guided by the rule of expanding output until marginal cost equals 
marginal revenue, to do so would undermine the jointly accepted price.” 
(Scherer and Ross, p 269).  In other words, only downward price adjustments 
are likely to be “less variable” or rigid. 
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A concentrated residential property market has all the ingredients for the type 
of oligopolistic coordination described above
1.  Where the underlying 
demand is a lready strong due to rapid economic growth and there is a 
naturally limited supply of land as in the case of Singapore, the incentive for 
firms to coordinate their pricing to extract the maximum profits is even greater. 
 
The effect of residential property mispricing probably has wider implications 
than for most other industries.  Economists are concerned about equilibrium 
pricing as a mechanism for efficient allocation of resources (Carlton, 1989).  
Administered commercial bank interest rates, for instance, result in the 
misallocation of credit and distortion of investment decisions (Fry, 1988).  
Over investment in property has a more deleterious impact than other 
misallocations. In many land scarce economies, residential property 
constitutes the largest single investment for many individuals.  An 
unsustainable high property price level has been the main element of many 
‘bubble’ economies. 
 
This study examines changes in Singapore private residential property prices 
over several decades.  While price levels would eventually adjust to each new 
equilibrium in the long run, the short run dynamics may reveal rigidities. 
There is persistent public opinion that prices are kept high by the developers 
acting cohorts.  One piece of evidence often cited is that developers would 
delay the release of completed units rather than reduce the price to move 
sales.  When speculation on residential properties reached a feverish pitch at 
the end of 1995, the clamor for government intervention also peaked.  The 
Singapore authorities responded by introducing a set of anti-speculation 
measures on May 15 1996 to cool the market.  This includes a 3% transaction 
tax and an unprecedented capital gains tax for properties sold within three 
years of acquisition.  Despite these measures, property prices have yet to 
show significant downward adjustments.  There are consistent media reports 
of developers keeping completed units from the market even at substantial 
interest costs of debt to avoid adding to the surplus output.  Whether 
property pricing is affected by collusive practices is important to policy 
makers.  If oligopolistic behavior does exist, the need for intervention to avert 
economic problems is clearly justified. 
 
2.  The Singapore Property Market 
 
                                                 
1 Even in industries where there is little friction in the production process, like 
banking for instance, price rigidity has been observed (see Neumark and Sharpe, 
1992 and Scholnick, 1996). 48  Ng 
   
The Singapore property market has enjoyed a bull run over the last decade.  
The index of private residential property prices increased by almost 300% 
from 1988Q1 to 1996Q4.  Over the same period, per capita GDP increased by 
less than 70%.  As can be seen from Figure 1, the upward spiral in prices is 
especially noticeable after the Gulf War in 1991. 
 
There is strong official encouragement for Singapore citizens to purchase 
their own properties for occupation.  Property is the only form of investment 
for which an individual can use up his Central Provident Funds (CPF). The 
CPF is a national funded pension scheme requiring nearly equal monthly 
contributions of 20% of gross salary each from the employee and the 
employer.  Until the mid-1980’s, this fund could not be used for other forms of 
investment and could be withdrawn only upon retirement.  Because the CPF 
paid interest rates below that of bank saving deposits, there is a strong 




                                                 
2 It is common for a married couple to plan their property acquisition in such a way 
that the monthly installment payment for the mortgage loan exceed the combined 
contributions to the CPF.   It is a current concern of the Singapore government that 
many citizens will retire with a valuable piece of property but little pension money. Asymmetric Price Response to Supply  49 
   
Figure 1 Singapore Private Residential Property Price Index and Per Capita 
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More than 80% of the population reside in government-built apartments.  The 
price of such public housing is subsidized.  The remaining 20% live in private 
properties ranging from houses to apartments.  The limited supply of private 
property makes them desirable.  Moving from public to private housing is 
known as “upgrading”.  At the end of 1996, there were 147,000 units of 
private property.  With rare exceptions like the measures taken on May 15 
1996, the Singapore government has left market forces to determine private 
residential property prices. 
 
Singapore is one of the smallest countries in the world,  having a land area of 
less than 250 square miles.  Increasing income coupled with the small portion 
of land set aside for private housing has induced a strong underlying demand 
for private residential properties.  Until the mid-1990’s, the private residential 
development industry was dominated by a handful of large  firms.  It is 
estimated that no more than six developers account for 65% to 95% of the 
new projects.  This is partly due to the process of land sales by the 
government.  The state is the largest landowner and regularly sells land for 
housing development.  The high cost of each piece of land has largely acted 
as a barrier to entry, leaving large firms to dominate the industry. 
 
The market structure and cursory evidence suggest that oligopolistic 
coordination in the Singapore residential property market is both possible and 
profitable.  The results in this study provide some evidence that this is the 
case. 
 
3.  Long Run Equilibrium and Short Run Impacts 
 
As discussed in Scherer and Ross (1990), an oligopoly would try to maintain 
prices above the competitive level.   A testable implication of such behavior is 
that prices take longer to come down than to go up to a new equilibrium
3.  In 
this paper, we focus on the speed of change when the residential property 
price level is above and below its equilibrium. 
 
The long run equilibrium price level of residential private properties is first 
assumed to be a function of economic determinants.  Disposable income, 
                                                 
3 The research design in this study is conceptually different from Case and Shiller 
(1989, 1990) who find evidence against random walk in residential property prices.  
Tests employed here do not address price increases and decreases but how price 
level moves toward a dynamic equilibrium.  Price level may be going up all the time 
but yet overshoot or undershoot an equilibrium dictated by economic fundamentals.  
Results found by Case and Shiller are not directly comparable to the evidence shown 
here. Asymmetric Price Response to Supply  51 
   
housing starts and mortgage rates are found to be good explanatory factors 
of the housing price level in the United Kingdom (Drake 1993). 
 
The Singapore Department of Statistics (DOS) keeps a record of several 
economic series.  From the DOS database, we selected a list of potential 
determinants of Singapore private residential property prices.  Using data 
from 1975Q1 to 1996Q4, the list is systematically pared.  Finally, the Gross 
Domestic Product, the property mortgage rate and the number of private 
property units completed in the quarter were found to be significant in the 
determination of property price levels. 
 
As with most economic time series, there is the likelihood of cointegration 
among the variables.  Engel and Granger (1987) show that when two time 
series are cointegrated, the OLS regression on the levels is misspecified.  An 
error correction model is normally used to adjust for the short run 
relationship.  The Engel and Granger approach is, however, limited to a 
bivariate model.  Johansen (1988) develops a maximum likelihood test for the 
existence of cointegrating vectors in a multivariate setting. 
 
Table 1 presents the results of the Johansen maximum likelihood test.  The 
variables selected, per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the average of 
15-year residential mortgage rate (MR) and the number of private residential 
properties completed in the quarter (UNITS) are indeed cointegrated with the 
private property index level (PI).  GDP, UNITS and PI are natural logarithm 
transformations of the original values. 
 
The test rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration but not the 
hypothesis that there is only one cointegrating vector.  The existence of a 
unique cointegrating vector resolves the form of error correction for the 
short-run model. We now elaborate on the three economic explanatory 
variables to provide a better understanding of the hypothesis and empirical 
approach. 
 
3.1  Per Capita GDP 
 
Singapore became an independent country in 1965.  At the end of 1996, there 
were about three million Singapore citizens with a GDP of S$80 billion.  From 
1975 to 1996, the DOS conducted an annual exercise to estimate the number of 
Singaporeans.  Using these annual population estimates, we can derive the 
GDP per capita.  From 1975Q1 to 1996Q4, the GDP per capita increased by 
430% from S$5,381 to S$28,449.  In a small country with limited land, we can 
expect rising income levels to cause an increase in property prices. 
Table 1 Results of the Johansen Maximum Likelihood Test  52  Ng 
   











0.6665  84.3067  47.21  54.46  None * 
0.2504  22.8162  29.68  35.65  At most 1 
0.0942    6.6762  15.41  20.04  At most 2 
0.0201    1.1383    3.76   6.65  At most 3 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 1% significance level     
 
L.R. test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level 
Normalized cointegrating coefficients.  Standard deviations are in 
parentheses.   
 
PI  GDP  MR.  UNITS  Constant 
1.0000  -2.5815  -0.0577  -0.3139  20.072 
  (0.1349)  (0.0163)  (0.0513)   
Note: Test of cointegration among private property price index (PI), Gross 
Domestic Product per capita (GDP), average 15-year finance 
company housing loan rate (MR) and the number of private property 
units completed UNITS. 
 
3.2  Residential Mortgage Rate 
 
The private residential mortgage market in Singapore is largely free from state 
intervention.  On occasions, the bank supervisory authority may advise 
lending institutions to limit their exposure to the property market.  The actual 
setting of interest rates has, however, always been left to the financial 
institutions themselves. 
 
Up to the early 1980’s, the main participants in the residential mortgage 
market were finance companies rather than the commercial banks.  Finance 
companies in Singapore specialize in consumer loans and mortgage lending 
makes up a substantial portion of their portfolios. 
 
Residential mortgage loans in Singapore range from 5 to 30 years with the 
intermediate maturities of 15 to 20 years being the most popular.  The interest 
rate on the 15-year loan has been regarded as a good benchmark for the cost 
of residential mortgage.  A record of the average interest rate on this loan set 
by finance companies has been maintained since 1980Q1.  In a normal 
residential property market, the mortgage rate should be negatively related to 
the price level. 
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3.3  Number of Private Residential Units Completed 
 
Singapore is a small country of less than 250 square miles.  Land and property 
is relatively scarce and the government maintains strict monitoring and 
control over real estate development. 
 
There are generally two types of land title for private residential properties.  
One is freehold which essentially means perpetual ownership.  With few 
exceptions, only privately owned land is freehold.  State owned land has a 99-
year leasehold.  In the 100
th year, the land reverts to the state.
4  It is estimated 
that the state supplies three quarters of all land for new private housing. 
 
Besides the limit on the lease, there is a significant constraint on the speed of 
development on 99-year leasehold land compared that of freehold land.  
Freehold land can be left vacant by an owner for an unlimited period.  For 99-
year leasehold land, there is a window of five years for the property to be 
completed starting from the day the land is bought from the state.  Failure to 
comply with this regulation can result in heavy penalties. 
 
Off all new private residential units built between 1975Q1 to 1996Q4, more 
than third of these were added between 1992Q1 and 1996Q4.  This half-
decade coincided with the rising popularity of condominiums which are 
increasingly built on 99-year leasehold sold by the state.  In a competitive 
market, such a prodigious increase in output should have had a significant 
impact on prices.  This, however, does not appear to have been the case. 
 
No more than a handful of large developers dominate the Singapore 
residential property industry.  This is partly a result of the state land sales 
process.  State land is sold by tender and until recently, each plot of land is 
designated for entire housing projects rather than single units.  Quite 
naturally, only large firms are able to incur the substantial investment cost of 
acquiring land for development.  Even for relatively small plots being 
tendered, large developers who want to build up their land banks for the 
future often crowd out the smaller players with aggressive bids.  This 
concentration in purchasing power was noticed and in 1994, the authorities 
tried to let small developers have a better chance at the tenders by 
fragmenting land for sale into smaller plots.  Despite this measure, much of 
private residential property remains in the hands of the big firms. 
A housing project can be offered for sale even before construction begins.  
All a developer needs is a building approval plan and a sale license which are 
                                                 
4 There is a third type of title which is the 999-year lease but such title is largely 
considered as no different from freehold. 54  Ng 
   
routinely granted in the early stages of development.  Most homebuyers and 
investors in Singapore make their buying decisions on no more than 
brochures and a show unit.  During the frantic years from 1993 to 1995, 
projects were often sold out within one day of public offer. 
 
Unlike the five-year limit for completing a 99-year leasehold development, 
there is, however, no regulation on how soon an actually completed project 
must be offered for sale to the public.  In other words, a developer with 
financial resources can withhold output from a slow market.  There are several 
means of doing so.  One is to simply keep the inventory.  Another is to lease 
rather than sell the units.  All these measures are aimed at not adding 
downward pressure to prices on the entire residential property market.  Table 
2 provides an indication of how far developers are prepared to go to hold 
prices at the expense of sales.  Since the market cooling measures introduced 
on May 15 1996, the volume of transactions in private residential properties 
has fallen by half.  Table 2 shows that there is a clear buildup of inventory 
from 1996Q1 to 1997Q1.  Despite this, prices offered for the new projects have 
hardly changed.  As a recent editorial in the business daily puts it “For 17 
months after the May anti-speculation measures last year, developers have 
been holding themselves remarkably in check.  When they competed against 
one another, it was in ways that did not openly affect prices ….  Some called 




Table 2 Proportion of Unsold Units in New Private Residential Projects 
Quarter  Houses  % Unsold  Apartments  % Unsold  Total  %Unsold 
1996Q1  3,281  58%  24,186   20%  27,467  24% 
1996Q2  3,017  53%  26,592   22%  29,609  25% 
1996Q3  3,426  61%  27,851   24%  31,277  28% 
1996Q4  3,256  66%  28,922   28%  32,178  32% 
1997Q1  3,682  68%  30,297   35%  33,979  39% 
Note:  Proportion of unsold units in new private residential projects where 
both the sales license and building plan approval have been 
granted.  Apartments include flats and condominiums. 
Source: Urban Redevelopment Authority of Singapore 
 
With one third of the new supply being added in the last five years, the 
pricing of new projects has a significant effect on the price level of all private 
residential properties.  It has been estimated by property analysts that 75% of 
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all transactions are on units sold by developers and the quoted price of the 
most recent project is often taken as the barometer for the entire property 
market.  Table 3 shows how transaction prices for all properties have held up 
and even increased despite the large oversupply of new units. 
 
Table 3: The trend of Average Transaction Prices by type of Property and 
Locality (Sing$/sq ft of floor area) 
  Houses  Apartments 
Month  Prime  Others  Prime  Others 
Jan ’96  733.17  642.52  982.70  658.99 
Feb ’96  728.38  633.70  994.59  677.16 
Mar ’96  786.04  662.27  1,009.31  692.93 
Apr ’96  781.70  677.55  1,064.33  758.15 
May ’96  816.74  705.46  1,103.55  752.20 
Jun ’96  868.03  653.70  1,102.92  709.16 
Jul ’96  747.04  660.78  1,883.28  717.93 
Aug ’96  777.11  648.68  1,414.51  736.04 
Sep ’96  950.35  632.06  1,039.53  684.56 
Oct ’96  764.73  612.37  1,095.84  697.77 
Nov ’96  1,028.22  633.68  1,450.59  706.22 
Dec ’96  695.93  603.32  1,306.03  742.21 
Jan ’97  825.39  658.49  1,177.96  666.37 
Feb ’97  796.18  604.09  1,124.40  680.65 
Mar ’97  846.49  620.94  1,259.52  677.63 
Note:  Average transaction price in Singapore dollars per square foot by 
type of property and locality.  Anti-speculation measures were 
introduced by the Government on May 15 1996 to cool the overheated 
residential property market. Apartments include flats and 
condominiums. 
 
The number of units completed (UNITS) would eventually translate into 
supply and can be expected to be negatively related to price level.  As 
discussed in Scherer and Ross (1990), however, inventory management to 
delay price adjustment is the preferred alternative in an oliogopoly where 
output lags demand.  If firms in the Singapore market do coordinate, there is 
likelihood that the price level responds to the lagged UNITS.  The lag would 
not be symmetric.  Price levels may rise quickly when there is a shortage, but 
may take longer to come down, if developers are able to slow the actual 
supply despite an accumulating inventory
6.  Since supply and pricing has to 
                                                 
6 Since how many and when to make available completed units for sale are business 
decisions, no reliable record is kept of the actual number of units being offered for 
sale. 56  Ng 
   
be coordinated to be effective, significant downward price rigidity may be 
regarded as evidence of oligopolistic behavior among property developers. 
 
4.  Model 
 
The long-run equilibrium price derived from the cointegrating vector allows 
us to examine the short-run price adjustments.  The difference between the 
actual and the predicted price level, which is the residual in the cointegrating 
vector, may be considered as the prediction error.  Using these residuals, we 
develop the error correction model to estimate the short-run dynamics for the 
property price index. 
 
Residential property prices can reasonably be assumed to respond to 
economic factors at a lag.  The effect of a change in mortgage rate, for 
instance, may be reflected in property price changes only after several 
quarters.  Beside economic determinants, the price change process may also 
have a momentum of its own. 
 
Modeling of the price change dynamics begins with a wide selection of 
potential variables and through systematic elimination, ends with a 
parsimonious representation.  The Akaike Information Criterion is used for 
the eventual selection.  The general model obtained with this approach is  
 
DPIt = b0 + b1Rt-1 + b2DPI t-i + b3DGDPt-j + b4DUNITSt-k  
           + b5DMRt-l + et,                 (1) 
 
where D is the first difference, PI is the price index, R the residual from the 
cointegrating vector shown in Table 1 and i, j, k, l the relevant lag lengths for 
each factor.  Since PI, GDP and UNITS are natural logarithm transformations 
of the raw values, the equation provides us with a measure of price elasticity 
with respect to the economic determinants.  Seasonalities were considered 
but eventually eliminated. 
 
This model assumes a symmetric adjustment in the price index.  As discussed 
in the previous section, this need not be so.  Downward revisions may be 
more rigid if developers have the market power to hold prices by rationing 
supply. 
 
We test for this possibility of asymmetry in price adjustments by using two 
dummy variables D
+ and D
- that take the value 
 
    D
+ = 1    if Rt-1 > m, 
    D
+ = 0    if R t-1 < m,      (2) Asymmetric Price Response to Supply  57 
   
and 
 
    D
- = 1    if R t-1 < m, 
    D
- = 0    if R t-1 > m,      (3) 
 
where m is the mean of R.  The statistic m, which is close to zero since it is 
derived from a regression, captures the average deviation of the actual price 
level from the predicted one.  It is the expected value of R and so when the 
price level is at equilibrium, R equals m.  When R is greater than m, the actual 
price level is above the forecast equilibrium. Similarly, R less than m means 
that the price level is below its equilibrium.  In the error correction model, a 
positive residual in the previous period R t-1 induces a negative short-run run 
price adjustment and vice-versa. 
 
Using the split residuals, we test for several possible asymmetries.  The first 
is an analysis of the overall short-run adjustments to the long run equilibrium 
by using the dummy variables to separate R into two subsamples which 
modifies equation 1 to 
 
DPIt = b0 + (b1aD
+ + b1bD
-)Rt-1 + b2DPI t-i + b3DGDPt-j 
                + b4DUNITSt-k + b5DMRt-l + et.                  (4) 
 
The coefficients b1a and b1b separately reflect short-run changes when the 
price level in the previous period was above and below equilibrium 
respectively.  The relative magnitudes of the two coefficients provide an 
indication of how fast disequilibrium is corrected.  If the absolute value of b1a 
is larger than that of b1b, a downward adjustment from above equilibrium is 
swifter than an upward adjustment from below equilibrium and vice-versa 
(Doornik and Hendry, 1994). 
 
The dummy variables are also used to test for asymmetric adjustments to GDP 
where 
 
DPIt = b0 + b1Rt-1 + b2DPI t-i + (b3aD
+ + b3bD
-)DGDPt-j  
           + b4DUNITSt-k + b5DMRt-l + et.                        (5) 
 
The coefficient b3a captures how price changes in response to a change in 
GDP when the price level is reverting to equilibrium from above.  Similarly, b3b 
measures the response when price level was below the equilibrium.  As with 
the coefficients for the residual R, a large absolute value in b3a (or b3b) is 
associated with less rigidity in price adjustment.  The magnitudes of these 
two coefficients would show how changing individual incomes affect 
residential property prices. 58  Ng 
   
 
The focus of this study is on the possibility of asymmetric adjustments to the 
variable UNITS as shown by 
 
DPIt = b0 + b1Rt-1 + b2DPI t-i + b3DGDPt-j + (b4aD
+ + b4bD
-)DUNITSt-k 
           + b5DMRt-l + et.              (6) 
 
The oligopolistic behavior hypothesis implies that b4a and b4b are different.  
Specifically, pricing coordination would be aimed at a slower price decrease 
than a price increase.  Empirically, this would be evidenced by a smaller 
absolute value of b4a than b4b. 
 
For completeness, we also test for asymmetric responses to the mortgage rate 
as follows: 
 
DPIt = b0 + b1Rt-1 + b2DPI t-i + b3DGDPt-j + b4DUNITSt-k  
           + (b5aD
+ + b5bD
-)DMRt-l + et.          (7) 
 
5.  Results 
 
The adjustment of quarterly property prices from disequilibrium is shown in 
Table 4.  Coefficient estimates for the base model which assumes symmetric 
adjustment are shown in the middle column.  The sign and magnitude for all 
the economic variables accord with intuition.  The effect of per capita GDP, 
for instance, is positive and has the largest value.  MR and UNITS have 
negative coefficients as expected.  The lag structure is also consistent with 
expectations that a change in transaction prices of residential properties 
follow changes in the fundamentals of the property market.  The 
contemporaneous values of the regressors are tested and found to have no 
explanatory power. 
 
Consistent with the error correction process, the coefficient of R is negative 
which indicates that the price level revises downward when it was above 
equilibrium in the previous period and vice-versa.  There is also a large 
positive coefficient for the price change at one lag.  This indicates a strong 
momentum in property price change but this momentum does not last beyond 
one quarter.  Among the economic factors, GDP has the largest impact but its 
effect shows up only after three quarters.  The variable UNITS impacts on 
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R t-1  -0.06723**   
  (-3.38)   
      D
+ R t-1    -0.0459 
    (-1.72) 
      D
- R t-1    -0.0980** 
    (-3.02) 
      DPI t-1  0.6610**  0.6302** 
  (8.03)  (7.33) 
      DGDP t-3  0.4599**  0.4302** 
  (3.85)  (3.54) 
      DUNITS t-2  -0.0329**  -0.0318** 
  (-3.63)  (-3.50) 
      DUNITS t-3  -0.0259**  -0.0240** 
  (-2.91)  (-2.68) 
      DMR t-1  -0.0333*  -0.0280 
  (-2.41)  (-1.94) 
      Adjusted R
2  0.57  0.58 
Durbin-Watson  2.16  2.07 
** Significant at 1%.,  * Significant at 5%. 
Note:  Coefficient estimates of short-run dynamics of quarterly property 
price index adjustment to GDP, mortgage rate MR and the number of 
units completed UNITS.  R is t he residual from the cointegrating 
vector.  The t-values are in parentheses. 
 
The assumption of symmetric adjustment is relaxed and the results are shown 
in the last column of Table 4.  The variable D
+ (D
-) captures the change when 
price level in the previous quarter was above (below) equilibrium.  It is 
evident that coefficient estimates for these two dummy variables are 
dissimilar. 
 
The size of the D
- coefficient is more than twice that of the D
+ coefficient and 
the former is significant at the 1% level,  while the latter not significantly 
different from zero.  This suggests asymmetry in the price adjustment 
process.  A larger absolute coefficient is consistent with a quicker price 
adjustment to the new equilibrium. D
- being larger than D
+ implies that price 
takes a shorter time to move up than down.  This result is consistent with the 60  Ng 
   
general observation of property prices in Singapore.  The source of such 
asymmetry is now examined in detail.  The results are presented in Table 5. 
 
The response of price to GDP is asymmetric.  In column 2 of Table 5, we can 
see that the coefficient for D
- is significantly different from zero, while that of 
D
+ is not.  This suggests that when price level is below equilibrium, an 
increase in per capita GDP induces a relatively quick upward revision of 
property prices.  A decrease in GDP, on the other hand, does not cause a fall 
in a price level from above equilibrium.  The coefficient for the upward is 
almost three times that of the downward change.  This is evidence that 
increasing individual income is a major cause of rising property prices in 
Singapore.  Even when the country was in recession in 1985 and 1986, the 
decline in prices was relatively insignificant compared to the rapid recovery 
thereafter.  The hypothesis that rising income is a key reason for the price 
spiral cannot be rejected. 
 
The results for the number of units completed UNITS are probably the most 
interesting.  As discussed earlier, this number is the output but not 
necessarily the actual supply for the property market.  Developers have the 
option to withhold completed units from sale when prices are not favorable.  
If such a course of action is sufficiently coordinated, a price revision 
downwards may be delayed.  The evidence is consistent with this 
hypothesis. 
 
The variable UNITS is significant at two and three lags.  When the 
assumption of symmetry is relaxed, the coefficients for the different lags are 
dissimilar.  At two lags, the adjustment is asymmetric.  D
- is significant while 
D
+ is not.   As with GDP, the downward price adjustment to UNITS is more 
rigid than the upward adjustment.  A lower rate of housing output causes 
prices to rise from below equilibrium after a lag of two quarters.  A higher 
number of completed units, on the other hand, does not lead to a fall in the 
price level from above equilibrium until three quarters later.  After three 
quarters, the effect of output is symmetrically reflected in prices. 
 
We can reasonably interpret these results as inventory management by 
developers to delay a fall in prices.   When the price level is above the long-
run equilibrium, supply is rationed to maintain the price.  This rationing can 
be both explicit and implicit.  Developers can keep output from the market or 
maintain prices at above equilibrium and wait for a recovery in demand to 
absorb the supply.  Evidence shows that developers are prepared to sacrifice 
sales for high prices. 
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  Variables  DGDP t-3  D UNITS t-2  DUNITS t-3  DMR t-1 
  R t-1  -0.057545** -0.066688**  -0.067161**  -0.068378** 
    (-2.81)   (-3.39)  (3.35)  (-3.13) 
 
  DPI t-1  0.669097**  0.687528**  0.657781**  0.658948** 
    (8.24)   (8.24)  (7.88)  (7.79) 
 
  D
+  0.232337   -0.016338  -0.029799*  -0.035114 
    (1.27)   (-1.13)  (-2.21)  (-1.82) 
 
  D
-  0.612394**  -0.042251**  -0.023346*  -0.031273 
    (4.06)   (-3.84)  (-2.12)  (-1.51) 
 
  DGDP t-3      0.491179**  0.465287**  0.460949** 
       (4.09)  (3.84)  (3.81) 
 
  DUNITS t-2  -0.035102**   -0.032621**  -0.032865** 
    (-3.88)     (-3.55)  (-3.58) 
 
  DUNITS t-3  -0.026175** -0.026866**    -0.025706** 
    (-2.99)   (-3.05)      (-2.85) 
 
  DMR t-1  -0.032419*  -0.031366*  -0.032973* 
    (-2.38)   (-2.29)  (-2.37) 
 
  Adjusted R
2  0.59  0.57  0.58    0.57 
 
  Durbin-Watson  2.17  2.16  2.11    2.11 
 
** Significant at 1%.  * Significant at 5%. 
Note: Coefficient estimates of short-run dynamics of quarterly property price 
index adjustment to GDP, mortgage rate MR and the number of units 
completed UNITS when price level was above and below equilibrium 
in the previous period.  t-values are in parentheses. 
 
Price adjustments to mortgage rate MR are symmetric.  This provides an 
interesting contrast to the results obtained for GDP and UNITS.  It suggests 
that residential property investors have a balanced sensitivity to individual 
financial fundamentals like mortgage costs more than economic fundamentals 
such as income and potential supply of property units.  The symmetry in the 
dummy variable coefficients also show that the asymmetries found earlier are 
not induced by model mis-specifications. 62  Ng 
   
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
High residential property prices in Asia may be fueled by more than strong 
economic growth.  The conditions in a private residential property market 
dominated by large firms, such as that in Singapore, facilitate oliogopolistic 
behavior.  The property market is characterized by supply meeting demand at 
a substantial lag.  Industrial Organization theory suggests that an oligopoly 
would collude to control supply to maintain prices above the competitive 
level as the natural alternative to profit maximization.  This can result in 
mispricing and serious misallocation of assets since residential property is 
often the largest single investment for most individuals. 
 
A testable implication of the collusion hypothesis is that the price level would 
take longer to come down than to go up to a  new equilibrium. Cursory 
evidence shows that residential property developers in Singapore are 
prepared to maintain the price level even at the expense of accumulating 
inventory.  Using economic variables to derive a long-run equilibrium model, 
we examine  the short-run price change dynamics of Singapore private 
residential property prices. We find evidence that price changes are not 
symmetric.  Consistent with general observations, property prices takes 
longer to come down than to go up to a new equilibrium.  A reason for this 
asymmetry is the effect of increasing wealth.  When the price level is below 
equilibrium, an increase in per capita GDP induces a significant upward 
revision.  This is not the case when price is above equilibrium.  Rising income 
is therefore a major cause of rising property prices. 
 
More importantly, the other source of asymmetry is how property units are 
supplied to the market.  The evidence shows that output in the form of 
completed units take longer to bring down the price level when it is above 
equilibrium.  On the other hand, a price increase due to lower supply is 
quicker. 
 
In Singapore, newly completed units make up a third of the supply of private 
residential property.  The pricing of new units affect the price level for the 
entire market.  Despite a sharp fall in demand and clear oversupply in the past 
year, transaction prices have barely changed.  These factors, together with 
the evidence on the asymmetric price response to output are not inconsistent 
with the hypothesis that oligopolistic behavior exists in the Singapore 
residential property market. 
 
One question often asked is why would developers choose to maintain the 
price level at a high inventory cost.  The answer is that this is strategically Asymmetric Price Response to Supply  63 
   
optimal.  The Real Estate Developers Association of Singapore has petitioned 
the government repeatedly to take measures to avert a crisis.  The high 
percentage of projects unsold is cited as evidence of an impending price 
crash although the developers have been reluctant to reduce prices.  
Recommendations included the lifting of all anti-speculation measures and 
the curbing of land sales.  The government was initially adamant in 
maintaining the rate of land sales and letting the market settle to its 
equilibrium.  Shortly after the completion of this paper, the government 
announced first a reduction of land to be sold in 1998, and later a complete 
deferral of remaining land to be sold this year to next year.  The window for 
completion of 99-year leasehold projects was extended from five  to eight 
years with a substantial reduction of the penalty for delays.  These measures 
lead to a cutback in the immediate and future supply, which is partly what the 
developers asked for in order to maintain the price level. 
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